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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of JASON PENA, 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Appearances : 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI ## 0 1 -07-ST7744 Index No. 4096-07 
Jason Pena 
Inmate No. 95-A-0070 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Gouverneur Correctional Facility 
Scotch Settlement Road 
P.O. Box 480 
Gouverneur, NY 13642-0370 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
120 Broadway, 24th Floor 
New York, New York 1027 1 
(Jose L. Velez, 
Assistant Attorney General 
01 Cuuirsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate currently residing at Gauverneur Correctional Facility, has 
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commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent 
dated December 20, 2005 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is 
serving a term of eight and a third to twenty five years on a conviction of first-degree 
manslaughter, running concurrently with a term of five to fifteen years for a conviction of 
second-degree criminal possession of a weapon and consecutively with a term of one and a 
half to three years for attempted first-degree promotion of prison contraband. Among the 
many arguments raised by petitioner (including those advanced in his administrative appeal) 
petitioner asserts that the Parole Board failed to consider the statutory factors under 
Executive Law tj 2594. In his view, the determination was based solely on the seriousness 
of the crimes for which he was incarcerated. He maintains that the Parole Board failed to 
consider his accomplishments while incarcerated', or his plans upon being released. He takes 
the position that the Parole Board improperly re-sentenced him to an additional term of 
imprisonment. In the petitioner's view, the Parole Board erred in not providing guidance as 
to how he could qualify for parole in the future. Petitioner also asserts that the Parole Board 
failed to provide anything other than general reasons for its determination, and that this 
violated his rights to due process. Finally petitioner asserts that respondent's decision not 
to parole him violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and New York 
Constitutions. 
'Petitioner provided a list of his activities while he has been incarcerated which include 
all of the following: earning a G.E.D., completion of several programs including ASAT, ART , 
AVP as well as programs on welding and plumbing, completion of DOCS Alcohol and 
S i h ~ s t ~ i i i ~ ~  i l l i 1 :c Tiiiiiiiiig I J ~  ig;1~1111:~, € i i : g  tt(ri It ii:? 1ctldc.l 
employment in the prison kitchen and as a housing porter. 
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Petitioner’s assertion that the Parole Board based it’s determination to deny parole 
solely upon the serious nature of the crimes for which the petitioner was incarcerated for, 
while not considering his various accomplishments during that incarceration is belied by the 
record. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
“The I.O., Manslaughter lS‘, CPW 2nd, Att. Promoting 
Contraband, involved you shooting ap person in the head and 
multiple times in his body as he lay on the ground, causing 
death. The Att. Promotion of Prison Contraband involved you 
possessing a weapon while in prison. This panel had made note 
of two Tier I1 infractions for unhygienic act and fighting since 
your last board. During your interview, you expressed little 
remorse for the victim and demonstrated limited insight into 
why you were so violent as to take a human life. This panel has 
noted your improved discipline and programmatic performance, 
however, when we consider all relevant factors, including your 
age, we believe that you need additional time in a structured 
setting. Return with a clean disciplinary record and continue to 
improve yourself.” 
As stated in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
IXy-nine-c of this article 5hall require that the following bc 
cuiisidcred: (i) h e  irisrituhmd rccilrd iiducliiig prograin goals 
md accnmplishments. wxlern ic  whievements, vrscntinnnl 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
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interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]). 
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable” (blattcr d Siriopuli 1, Nmc York Stae Board ofParole.189 
AD2d 960,960 [3rdDept., 19931, citing b1;iitrr o~Mc.E;cc. 1. N u \  York S u t c  Bd. ofparole, 
157 AD2d 944). If the Parole Board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, the Board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (see Ristau v. 
Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality 
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate 
judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting 
Miutcr 01 Kusso br. NCN k’urk Slaic. Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence 
of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made 
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his education, his employment history while 
incarcerated, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. Furthermore, the decision 
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was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and 
it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 (see Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 20 1 
AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 
AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board 
consider the seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir 
v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of 
Sinopoli v. New York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v 
Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history (see Matter 
of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 
556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight 
to each factor that it considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly 
discuss each one (see Matter of Farid v Travis, supra; Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 233 AD2d 653 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of Collado v New York State Division 
of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3rd Dept., 20011). Nor must the parole board recite the precise 
statutory language set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law 6 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see 
Matter of Silvern v Dennis-, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere 
appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the 
circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s 
criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the 
individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her 
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the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law"' (Matter of Durio v New 
York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 8 16 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 
[2] [c] [A], other citations omitted). 
Petitioner's claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to ii ru- 
sentencing are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State 
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rd Dept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive 
1)cpartInerit Brurd of' .4ppcafs i in i t .  281 AD2d 672 [3rd Dept., 20011; Matter of Evans v 
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). Moreover, it is well settled 
that the Parole Board is vested with the discretion to determine whether release was 
appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of 
petitioner's sentence (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of 
Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd Dept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; 
Marlzr oLBurress + Dcwiism, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd Dept., 20071). 
The record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision was predetermined 
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent 
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument (see Matter of 
Lue-Shim v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827,828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New 
York Division of Pnrolc, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293 
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051, 
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061). 
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged vinlr\tinn of his right to 
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due process, the Court observes that it has been repeatedly held that a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest does not arise under Executive Law 0 2594, since it does not create 
an entitlement to, or legitimate expectation of release (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 169 [2nd 
Cir., 20011; Marvin v Chord, 255 F3d 40 [2nd Cir., 20011, at p. 44; Paunetto v Hammock (5 16 
F Supp 1367 [US Dist. Ct., SD NY, 19811; Washington v White, 805 F Supp 191 [SDNY, 
19921). The Court, accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
The Parole Board’s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months) 
is within the Board’s discretion and was supported by the record (see, Matter of Tatta v State 
ofNew York, Division ofparole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604). 
Furthermore, petitioner’s argument that the Parole Board is required to advise 
petitioner and/or provide guidance with regard to the programs he should take, or 
rehabilitative efforts he should engage in to increase his chance for release at a future parole 
interview has no merit (see Executive Law 5 2594 [2] [a]; 9 NYCRR 0 8002.3; Boothe v 
Hammock, 605 F2d 661 [2nd Cir, 19791; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division of 
-9 Parole 21 AD3d 1174 [3rd Dept., 20051). 
Finally, with respect to petitioner’s equal protection argument, the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution forbids States from denying to any person within 
their jurisdiction the cqunl pi-otc‘ctio~i of thc l a t i  s, but doi.5 not pl-c~~ci~t  thr. Skitcs fiwn 
making reasonable classifications among persons (Western & S.L.I. Co. v Bd. of 
Equalization, 451 US 648, 68 L Ed 2d 514, 523 101 S Ct 2070 [1981]). Where the action 
tinder review d n w  not invnlrc n riirpcct clnw nr fiindnmcntnl ripht. it i s  not whjcct tta F:tt.ict 
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judicial scrutiny, but rather is examined using the rational basis standard to determine if the 
action violated the equal protection clause (see, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v Murgia, 
427 US 307,49 L Ed 2d 520,524,96 S Ct 2562 and Maresca v Cuomo, 64 NY2d 242,250). 
In this instance there is simply no evidence of either selective or disparate treatment or that 
the respondent’s determination was motivated by impermissible considerations (see Giordano 
v City of New York, 274 F3d 740, 75 1 [Znd Cir., 20011). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and finds them to be without 
merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are 
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this 
Decision/Order/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this 
DecisiodOrder with notice of entry. 
Dated: 
ENTER 
September 34(, 2007 
Troy, New York Supreme Court Justice 




Order To Show Cause dated Verified Petition, Memorandum of Law, 
Supporting Papers and Exhibits 
Respondent’s VeriGed Answer dated February 2 1,  2007, Supporting Papers 
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